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the state and b) out of business conducted within the state. The Ken-
tucky Act is not so limited.
The distinction may best be pointed out by example. A, citizen and
resident of Ohio, operates a motor sales agency in Kentucky. He neg-
ligently drives his automobile in Illinois so as to injure B. Under the
terms of the Kentucky section, B could in suing A, serve the resident
manager of A's motor sales agency while such service under the Iowa
statute is invalid. The following situation In Kentucky would be valid
service and invalid in Iowa: The accident occurs while the nonresident
owner is on a pleasure trip in the state where the business is located,
and service is had on the resident agent.
Does the fact that the scope of the Kentucky provision is not
limited by its terms to causes of action arising within the state out of
business conducted therein make it so unreasonable as to be an invalid
exercise of police power? It is believed that it does, and that as applied
to causes of action arising outside the state and or unconnected with
the business carried on within the state it is unconstitutional. How-
ever, it should be regarded as severable, and valid as to causes of action
arising within the state out of business carried on therein. It is urged
that that conclusion, which is supported by Professor Scott,' is the
correct one, and should be adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
should this point rise again.
-J. PAUL CURRY
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN KENTUCKY
Actions for damages for breach of contracts not to compete and
suits for injunctions restraining the breach of such contracts reach-
ing the Court of Appeals of Kentucky have been very numerous; and
the decisions of that Court have shown a remarkable uniformity in the
treatment of such cases. In its decisions, the court states that though
the common law applying to contracts in restraint of trade is in force
in this state the rigor of the early rule that any contract which tended
to restrain trade was void has long since been relaxed; and that the
rule governing such contracts may be stated as follows: Covenants
in partial restraint of trade are valid when they are agreements by a
seller of business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to
decrease the value of the business; by a retiring partner not to compete
with the firm; by a retiring partner not to do anything to hinder the
" Scott Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a
State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 890. Scott is supported in his gen-
eral conclusions by Beale, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec. 84.3, p. 363-4. See
also Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 563, 583. Cf. Beale, Progress of the Law (1919) 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 12; Stumberg, op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 95, n. 6. (Quoted in n. 14,
supra); Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) secs. 84, 85. See also,
Comment (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1433, 1434.
1 Scobee v. Brent, 185 Ky. 734, 216 S. W. 76 (1919); Elkins v. Bar-
clay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S. W. (2d) 945 (1932).
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business of the partnership; by an assistant or agent not to compete
with his master or his employer after the expiration of his term of
service; by the buyer of property not to use it in competition with
the business retained by the seller; or an agreement made by the
lessor of property not to use it in competition with the business of the
lessee. To this is added the proviso that such contracts should be
(a) merely ancilliary to the main purpose of a lawful contract
(b) necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legiti-
niate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an
unjust use of those fruits by the other party, (c) for a just and honest
purpose, (d) reasonable as between the parties, (e) not prejudicial or
specially injurious to the public interest, (f) or does not tend to sup-
press competition nor create a monopoly.
2
The majority of the cases arising out of these contracts in Ken-
tucky have been in connection with the sale of a business or pro-
fession. The point of atack being that the contract was unreasonable
as between the parties as being too extensive in territory and time
covered, or, in a few cases, that the business sold was of a quasi-public
nature, and that, therefore, such an agreement could not be entered
into with respect to it because it would interfere with the owner's
duties to the public. A few cases have arisen out of the violation by
an employee of an agreement not to compete after leaving the employ
of the master, and in which the employee attempted to justify his
breach because of the unreasonableness of the territory covered by the
contract; and a few other cases have arisen in which clearly the agree-
ment was solely for the purpose of creating a monopoly in one of
the parties to the contract.
In considering whether or not these contracts are reasonable as
between the parties, the Kentucky court has given very little attention
to the time element, which has ranged from definite periods of one,
two, five or ten years to "so long as" the covenantee remains in the
business sold, the latter provision being the one most usually found,
and the court has accepted these limitations as to time as reasonable.
However, the reasonableness of the covenant in relation to the territory
covered, both in the buyer-seller and employee-employer contracts
'Clemons v. Meadows, 123 Ky. 178, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 619, 94 S. W.
13, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 847, 124 Am. St. Rep. 339 (1906); Barrone v. Mose-
ley Bros., 144 Ky. 698, 139 S. W. 869 (1911); Nickell v. Johnson, 162
Ky. 520, 172 S. W. 938 (1915) ; Elkins v. Barclay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S. W.
(2d) 945 (1932); Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. (2d) 165
(1938). The reason for the rule is stated thus in Clemons v. Meadows:
"Such contracts are intended to secure to the purchaser the good will
of the trade or business, and as a guaranty the vendor agrees -ot to
engage in like business or trade at that place for a specified time.
In these cases the restraint to be valid must not be more extensiva
than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the vendee, in the
enjoyment of the business which he has purchased. In this class of
cases the court recognizes that the vendor has received an equivalent
for his agreement to partially abstain from business at the place
where his business was formerly conducted."
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
(which seem to be governed by the same principles), has been the deter-
mining factor in these cases.
The test by which reasonableness or territory is determined may
be stated in the words of the court in the case of Linneman & Moore
%,. Alison & Yates:3
"A stipulation that another shall not pursue his trade or
employment at such a distance from the place of business of the
person to be protected that it could not possibly affect or injure
him would be unreasonable. On the other hand, a stipulation is
unobjectionable and binding which imposes a restraint to only such
an extent of territory as may be necessary for the protection of
the party making the stipulation, provided it does not violate two
indispensable conditions-that the other party be not prevented
from pursuing his calling, and that the country be not deprived of
the benefits of his exertions."
Applying this test, agreements in which the territory stipulated
was a town;4 a county;5 four counties; 6 "within 50 miles of the city
of Covington;" over an established stage route; 8 the state of Indiana;'
"In any city or state where or within which he shall have worked for
party of the first part under this contract";"0 and "at any place in the
United States or Canada which is within a radius of 100 miles of any
city of which the Davey Company may at any time be maintaining an
office for the conduct of its business,"l were all upheld as being reason-
able, when considered in coniection with the business or employment
intended to be protected by the contract. On the other hand, where
the agreement was not to re-engage in the business "anywhere" while
1142 Ky. 309, 134 S. W. 134 (1911)
4 Skaggs v. Simpson, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 410, 110 S. W. 251 (1908);
Keen v. Ross, 186 Ky. 256, 216 S. W. 605 (1919); Eigelbach v. Boone
Loan & Investment Co., 216 Ky. 69, 287 S. W. 225 (1926).
5 Elkins v. Barclay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S. W. (2d) 945 (1932); Johnson
v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. (2d) 165 (1938).
6 Durham v. Lewis, 231 Ky. 601, 21 S. W. (2d) 1004 (1929).
Linneman & Moore v. Allison & Yates, 142 Ky. 309, 134 S. W. 134
(1911).
ONickell v. Johnson, 162 Ky. 20, 172 S. W. 938 (1915).
* Kochenrath v. Christman, 180 Ky. 799, 203 S. W. 738 (1918)
(KQchenrath was conducting a mail order liquor business In New
Albany, Ind., which he sold to Christman, at the time agreeing not to
again engage in the business in the State of Indiana for a period of
five years. It was held that the contract was valid and that the
restraint was not unreasonable as being over an entire state consider-
ing the nature of the business. It was reasonably necessary for the
protection of the business. The court said: "By the agreement in
controversy the seller disposed of the entire business, and the restraint
imposed Is ancillary to the contract of sale, and therefore the contract
falli within the rule that the restraint imposed must be iucidental to,
and in support of, another cQntract or sale in which the purchaser
acquires some interest in the business needing protection,")
Thomas W. iBriggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295
(MG2),
Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 23Z Ky. 114, 25 S.W. (2d)
62 (1930).
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the vendee was engaged therein at Cadiz, it was interpreted by the court
as being unlimited both in time and territory and as such unreasonable
and void as against public policy."
The question of whether or not the court may cut down the terri-
tory, if it is too broad, and enforce it as to that which would be reason-
able, was raised in the case of Ackelbein v. The Davey Tree Expert
Co."a Ackelbein received special training in tree surgery, agreeing to
work for the Davey Company for a period of 3 years and that during
his employment and for a year thereafter he would not do tree surgery
for any person for whom he had worked while in the employ of the
company, or at any place in the United States or Canada which was
within a radius of 100 miles of any city of which the Davey Co. may at
any time be maintaining an office for the conduct of its business. He
violated the contract and the company brought suit asking that he be
enjoined from engaging in tree surgery within 100 miles of any city
where Davey & Company maintained an office. The chancellor, basing
his decision on the opinion of Judge Dietzman given on a motion to
discharge a temporary injunction, limited the injunction to territory
within a radius of 100 miles of the cities of Cincinnati and Louisville,
though he expressed the opinion that the Company was entitled to the
full relief prayed for. The opinion of Judge Dietzman was to the effect
that such an extent of territory was not necessary to protect plaintiff's
business but that since the whole includes the part, "if the covenant
is too broad, there is no reason why the parties should not receive pro-
tection to the extent of the reasonable part included in the whole."
This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; but an appeal by
the Company on the same record was taken by which the Company
sought to have the contract upheld as to the entire territory, and the
court said that considering that the business of doctoring trees neces-
sarily covers extensive areas and that the Company had only two offices
In Canada and three west of the Mississippi river in the United States,
the covenant was not too broad, but was reasonably necessary for the
protection of the company in the conduct of its business; the company's
injunction should extend to the entire territory covered by the cove-
nant. This is the only case in which this question of cutting down ter-
ritory has been raised in Kentucky.
The question of whether or not the court will extend the territory
covered by the covenant beyond the strict letter of the contract has
arisen more often, and the court has been very generous to the cove-
nantee in restricting the covenantor not only to that territory specified
but to surrounding territory where operations within such surrounding
territory Interferred with the business of the covenantee. Thus, in the
case of Johnson v. Stumbo," the agreement was that the parties "will
2Torain v. Fuqua, 175 Ky. 428, 194 S.W. 359, L.R.A. 1917 F. 251
(1917).
= 233 Ky. 115, 25 S.W. (2d) 62 (1930).
14 277 Ky. 301, 126 S.W. (2d) 165 (1938).
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not own or operate a hospital by purchase or lease; or otherwise, in
Floyd County, Kentucky, for a period of 10 years." Dr. Stumbo began
the operation of a hospital in Knott county, about 300 yards from the
Floyd County line in which he received patients from Floyd County.
The Court of Appeals said that an injunction should issue enjoining
Stumbo from operating a hospital in Floyd County, and from receiving
in any hospital for treatment any person living or residing in Floyd
County. "It is true that the letter of the contract in respect of location
of the hospital was strictly observed. But .... the intent devel-
oped is alone material . . . geography is not important. The
important thing was the protection against an unjust competitive
encroachment upon the community being served and the business
being received." To the same effect are the cases of Bkaggs v. Simp-
son,u Elkins v. Barclay and other cases as set out in the notes.'
In the case of Clemons v. Meadows,28 decided in 1906, the court had
before it a contract between the owners of the only first class hotels in
Fulton. By the contract, Meadows agreed to close his hotel for three
years, Clemons to pay him $100.00 per month. Clemons failed to pay
and action was brought by Meadows. The court held that the purpose
of this contract was to create a monopoly in Clemons and was against
public policy and void, stating in the opinion that a contract in restraint
of trade may be valid where it is in connection with a sale of good will
as that is a consideration for the contract, but here there was no such
consideration; the court further stated that the hotel was a quasi-
public institution and the owner owed a certain duty to the public to
keep it open. After this case was decided, the point that the business
was of a quasi-public nature was raised on several occasions" but dis-
In Skaggs v. Simpson, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 410, 110 S.W. 251 (1908)
the agreement was not to open up a marble shop in Murray for three
years after the sale of the business. Within the three years, Simpson,
the seller, opened up such a business 150 ft. outside of the city limits.
In holding that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining
defendant from conducting his establishment and to damages the court
said: "The only question in this case is whether or not the rights of
the parties are to be determined and fixed by the strict letter of the
writing." Simpson may at other places establish himself in business
but "he must not do so in territory in which it may be presumed he
would come into direct opposition with Skaggs, or in the territory in
which he had been doing the business that he sold."
"Elkins v. Barclay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S.W. (2d) 945 (1932) (Elkins
sold Barclay equipment and supplies of undertaking business and it
was agreed that Elkins would not again engage in the business of
undertaker or embalmer in the county so long as Barclay engaged in
that business in that county. Elkins established business outside of
county, but was called into and did business within that county. Plain-
tiff granted damages and injunction.)
'- Gutzeit v. Strader, 158 Ky. 131, 164 S. W. 318 (1914); Kochen-
rath v. Christman, 180 Ky. 799, 203 S. W. 738 (1918).
123 Ky. 178, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 619, 94 S.W. 13 (1906).
"Nickell v. Johnson, 162 Ky. 520, 172 S.W. 938 (1915); Torian v.
Fuqua, 175 Ky. 428, 194 S.W. 355 (1917); Elkins v. Barclay, 243 Ky.
144, 47 S.W. (2d) 945 (1932).
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posed of with no more comment than: "This was a quasi-public busi-
ness but this fact does not authorize the appellant to interpose it to
relieve him of his contract;" made in the case of Elkins v. Barclay,;
2
until the decision in the Johnson v. Stumbo case in which this point
is discussed, along with the Kentucky cases involving businesses of a
quasi-public character, and it is pointed out that where the agreement
is In connection with a sale of the business and its good will, the fact
that the business is of a quasi-public character does not affect the con-
tract; but that where the contract is not in connection with such sale
but is an independent or dissociated contract to suppress competition
or create a monopoly, then the contract will not be upheld. However,
in Kentucky, those cases arising under independent contracts made
between rivals in business for the purpose of suppressing competition
or creating a monopoly have uniformly been held void as against public
policy, regardless of the nature of the business.2
The extent to which the Kentucky court will go in carrying out
the spirit rather than the letter of the contract is illustrated by the
decision in Keen v. Ross." Ross and others were in the livery business
as partners in Burkesville. Ross went out of the business, selling his
Interest to the others and agreeing never again to engage in the livery
business in the town of Burkesville so long as any of the others engaged
In the business. Later he became interested in the automobile business
and operated an automobile for hire. The court granted an injunction
against him restraining him from violating the contract saying:
"We know . . . that the transportation of members of the
public for hire is now . - - performed with the use of the auto-
2243 Ky. 144, 47 S.W. (2d) 945 (1932).
2277 Ky. 301, 126 S.W. (2d) 165 (1938).
1 Clemons v. Meadows, supra n. 18, where the contract was between
owners of rival hotels, for the closing of one of the hotels; Anderson
v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375, 12 S.W. 670, 672 (1889) in which an agreement
between the owners of two rival steam boats on the Kentucky River
not to compete with each other but to divide the net earnings of each
between them was held void as against public policy, it destroying
competition and creating a monopoly; Artic Ice Co. v. Franklin Co.,
145 Ky. 32, 139 S.W. 1080 (1911) in which an agreement between rival
ice companies whereby one agreed to sell all its out-put to the other
which discontinued manufacturing ice and sold at higher prices than
when the companies were competing was held void as against public
policy; Brent v. Gay, 149 Ky. 615, 149 S.W. 915 (1912) (Contract
between buyers of blue grass seed among themselves to control the
market was held void); Jackson v. Sullivan, 276 Ky. 666, 124 S.W. (2d)
1019 (1939) (Defendant became member of association of contractors
which consisted of 140 members. Association adopted N.R.A. code and
entered into an agreement not to compete for building work to be done
in Jefferson County except in competition with members of the associa-
tion. Agreement provided for fine for violation of agreement.
Defendant competed with bidder not member and association assessed
a fine and this action was to recover the fine. Held: the provision
of the contract was in unreasonable restraint of trade and void as being
contrary to public policy.)
-186 Ky. 256, 216 S.W. 605 (1919).
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mobile, which has in great measure supplanted the old horse-dxawn
carriage, . . It is therefore patent that the contracting parties
in the instant case, at the time of the execution of the contract,
intended to deprive the defendant of the right of performing any
service for the public which was an essential part of that performed
by one engaged in the livery business, and the fact that such service
was performed in a different manner from the way it was formerly
done will not excuse the defendant in violating the very purpose
and object intended by the contract."
No particular form is required for these covenants. Thus, the mere
memorandum, given in connection with the sale of a marble shop, in
these words, "This is to certify that I will not open up a marble shop
in the city of Murray in three years," and signed by the seller, was held
sufficient.' Neither is it essential that the covenant be In writing, if it
is possible that it may be completed within one year, as when the con-
tract is not to engage in business so long as one of the parties remains
in business.'
No cage involving covenants not to compete has arisen in Kentucky
in which the rights of either party to envoke the particular remedy
asked for has been questioned. In some cases the plaintiff has sought
damages for breach of the contract, In others he has asked for an
injunction restraining defendant from breaching the contract, but in
the majority of the cases, plaintiff has sought both damages and an
injunction, which, of course, is permissible under our code procedure,
and too well established to permit of questioning.
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OIL AND GAS-COMPARISON OF RESULTS UNDER OWNERSHIP
AND NON-OWNERSHIP VIEWS
The law of oil and gas is an exclusive subdivision of property law.
Because of its fugacious nature it has been likened to animals
ferae naturae; but this is not absolutely correct if for no other reason
than that animals ferae naturae are owned by the State, until a person
brings them Into possession, while oil and gas are not owned by the
State. Another analogy has been advanced stating that oil and gas
should be governed by the law of percolating waters. This Is errone-
Qus, because the owner of the land cannot use the water for commercial
14 Skaggs v. Simpson, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 410, 110 S.W. 251 (1908).
2 Dickey v. Dickinson, iLO5 Ky. 751, 49 S.W. 761 (1899) (A contract
not to again engage in, the newspaper business in the town of Glasgow
is possible of performance within a year by the death of the obligor
within that time, and not within the statute of frauds); Nickell v.
Johnson, 162 Ky. 520, 172 S.W. 938 (1915).
2In Ohio Oil Co. v Ind., 177 U.S. 190 (1900), the Supreme Court
recognizes the fallacy in the analogy of oil and gas and wild animals,
and says that although they are similar they are not identical. See
Roberts, Right of a State to Restrict Exportation of Naural Resources
(1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 259, 266.
